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Abstract
The emergence of state taxation in the 14th century is intrinsically associated with monetary and financial development. In Catalonia, 
the crux of this joint evolution was the emergence of general taxes over the entire land, which required the towns to implement the cen-
sal, leading, in turn, to consolidated public debt and the financial slump of the 1380s, followed by difficulties caused by errors in mone-
tary policy. The creation of the Taula de Canvi de Barcelona in 1401 mitigated both problems, but after 1440 the manufacturing crisis 
and currency problems prompted heavy clashes with the municipal power, one of the factors in the 1462-1472 Civil War, which would 
prove ruinous to the country. The subsequent redress was not enough: the war had depleted Catalonia’s economic and political power.
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The crisis of the late Middle Ages is primarily a crisis in the 
etymological sense of the word, a moment in which the old 
structures are adapted or replaced.1 The changes were both 
political and economic and therefore affected society as a 
whole; however, the economic changes were the ones that 
both drove and paved the way for the structural changes.
The most important economic transformations are relat-
ed to an agricultural system which was basically self-supply-
ing yet generated a rising surplus and was aware of the mar-
ket possibilities. This was joined by a rise in trade that added 
to the traditional luxury products, home manufactures, raw 
materials and agricultural products. The consequence and 
support of these two facts was a rising monetisation of the 
economy. In around 1300, the market was the epicentre of 
the economy, and market means currency and credit.2
The political transformations that accompanied the 
economic changes are embodied by the shift from feudal 
predominance to the pre-eminence of the monarchies, 
stemming from the decreasing importance of the feudal 
chivalry compared to the paid infantry (soldiers). This 
change required an outlay of money that could not be ful-
filled with the monarchy’s traditional patrimonial reve-
nues.3 Under these conditions, the war led to the creation 
of state taxation which was the first state structure. By the 
end of the period, the monarchic state and the king’s po-
litical superiority would be firmly entrenched.
Therefore, the 14th and 15th centuries witnessed eco-
nomic growth accompanied and leveraged by a rise and 
improvement in the monetary and financial instruments, 
while at the same time by a heavy growth in fiscal pressure, 
which had a huge impact on the economy and standards 
of living.4 This article will examine these latter aspects: the 
monetisation of the economy and its consequences, the in-
crease in credit and its main instrument, financial entities, 
and also the emergence of state taxation.
Studying these phenomena separately conceals their 
constant interrelations; hence, I prefer to examine their 
joint evolution through four time sequences: before the 
Black Death: the early problems; the crisis in the second 
half of the 14th century; recovery and clashes in the 15th 
century; and the Civil War (1462-1472) and political and 
economic decline.
Before the Black Death: The early problems
At the start of the 14th century, Catalonia was in the midst of 
both a political and an economic upsurge. The conquest of 
Sicily (1285), the victory against the invasion of the French 
crusaders (1295) and the adjudication of the Kingdom of 
Sardinia (1297) signalled the peak of Mediterranean imperi-
alism. Economically, between 1280 and 1350, Barcelona be-
came a world-class market with major banking and insur-
ance activities, while it also began to manufacture quality 
cloth. Catalonia’s territorial and commercial expansion 
around the Mediterranean are two different processes that 
took place at different paces, but they clearly had synergies.5
The challenge of the rising monetisation of the economy 
According to Spufford, the main monetary problems in 
the late Middle Ages were the shortage of mineral and the 
differences in monetary policy depending on whether the 
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monarchs or the urban municipalities held the authority 
to mint money. They each had divergent interests: the 
monarchies were known for steep devaluations followed 
by returns to strong currencies, following the cycles of 
war and peace. In contrast, the commercial cities (mainly 
the Italian cities and Barcelona) were interested in main-
taining the value of their currencies, sometimes even be-
yond all logic.6
In around 1300, Catalan currency maintained the Car-
olingian tradition of the pound of 20 sous (shillings), each 
of 12 diners (pennies). An agreement in 1256 between the 
king and the Consell de Cent (Council of One Hundred), 
that is, the city government of Barcelona, established as 
currency the diner de tern, that is, the diner with a silver 
content of three parts (named also diners) over the dozen 
that fine silver has: so the diner de tern contained a quar-
ter of diner de plata. It also declared the diner de tern per-
petual and attributed authority over it to the town of Bar-
celona.7 At that time, most of the neighbouring countries 
were already issuing “grossos” (fine silver coins), but their 
Catalan equivalent, the silver ral or croat, was not admit-
ted until 1285. Just before the Black Death, the Crown of 
Aragón joined the countries that were issuing gold coin 
by imitating the Florentine florin, but its history falls 
within the next period.
The formation of the financial system
Despite the rising monetisation, to function, the economy 
required credit in all its guises. However, I shall only dis-
cuss two aspects: banking as an institution specialising in 
credit and in particular its role in the finances of the mon-
archy and the municipalities,8 and the public debt, repre-
sented by the censals.
By the late 13th century, there were numerous powerful 
bankers in Catalonia; we only know the names of some of 
them, most of them associated with the royal or urban fi-
nances. The monarch’s protection of the bankers to whom 
he was indebted and whom he was unable to pay led to the 
reaction of the Courts, which laid the groundwork for Cat-
alan banking laws.9 The 1300 Courts of Barcelona and 1301 
Courts of Lleida ordered moneychangers to keep a record 
of transactions in a legal ledger, declared that bank deposits 
had the status of order (that is, money released to do busi-
ness), required moneychangers to deposit a high bond 
(1,000 silver marcs in Barcelona and Lleida, 300 else-
where),10 required them to be answerable with all their as-
sets for the money deposited with them, and condemned 
bankrupt moneychangers to never exercise their trade 
again and to be imprisoned with just bread and water until 
they paid off their debts. Significantly, the Courts also pro-
hibited the king from allowing moneychangers to delay 
payments. Despite this, in 1309 Jaume II exonerated Beren-
guer de Finestres, Bartomeu Cendra and Pere de Santpere 
from their stigma in view of the debts he owed them and 
was unable to pay. The provisions became even more strin-
gent in the 1321 Courts of Girona, which stipulated a death 
sentence for bankrupt bankers who could not reach an 
agreement with their creditors; two years later this sentence 
would extend to all silent partners in bankruptcy.11
The rising inadequacy of the monarchy’s resources
Jaume II’s difficulties paying his bankers are a good ex-
ample of the monarch’s insufficient resources. This led to 
1a - Diner of Peter III the Ceremonious, diameter:16mm 
1b - Croat of Peter III the Ceremonious, diameter: 24mm
1c - Principat or ducat of Ferdinand II the Catholic (1493), diame-
ter: 23mm
1d - Perpinyà florin of Peter III the Ceremonious, diameter: 19mm
Figure 1. (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d). The main Catalan silver and gold coins: 
diner, croat, florin and principat or ducat. 
© Museu Nacional d’Art de Catalunya, Barcelona (2016)
Photo: Marta Mérida
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the transformation of feudal taxation into state taxation 
in a long process that spans primarily from the 1280s to 
the mid-14th century. Traditionally, the royal coffers 
were filled by the lands owned by the king, most of which 
were granted in emphyteusis, along with direct taxes on 
his seigneuries, taxes and exactions on religious minori-
ties, indirect taxes on sales and markets (import, export 
and passage taxes, measurements, market taxes) and oth-
er random revenues, such as laudemiums and emphyteu-
tic entries, income from the justice system and scribe tax-
es.12 The king could also demand donations from the 
Courts and the royal cities, but the 1283 Courts of Barce-
lona had banned any general constitution without its own 
approval; this was the principle of pactism in action, but it 
was also a confirmation of the limitations on the mon-
arch’s fiscal power.13 At the same time, the kings pres-
sured the royal cities and towns as much as they could 
and often made them pay for the monarch’s immediate 
help with future concessions. They also exerted pressure 
over the Jewish quarters. However, all of this still did not 
supply the king enough resources, especially at times of 
war: the sovereigns were repeatedly required to hock or 
sell part of the royal assets, a solution that allowed them to 
solve their immediate dilemmas but at the expense of 
lowering their future revenues. From 1320 to 1340 alone, 
the income from royal patrimony dropped by half.14
Given the insufficiency of its income, the monarchy in-
creasingly had to enlist the aid of its subjects.15 The 1289 
Courts of Montsó and the 1292 Courts of Barcelona 
granted general subsidies to the king for the first time; 
that is, the subjects of the nobility and of the Church also 
had to pay.16 This was the beginning of state taxation, 
which would spread quickly and become an essential fac-
tor in the economic, political and social changes in the 
late Middle Ages.
The largely peaceful years between 1305 and 1321 al-
lowed a respite from tax demands; however, the conquest 
of Sardinia (1321-1324)17 and the wars against Genoa and 
Granada (1327-1336) gave the final impetus to state taxa-
tion. Upon the concession of a new subsidy, Barcelona 
asked to collect it through indirect taxes, which it regard-
ed as a more effective, quicker procedure than the previ-
ous talles. Tarragona, Tortosa, Girona, Palamós, Sant Fe-
liu de Guíxols and Lleida soon followed the capital’s 
example by supplementing or replacing direct taxes, like 
the quèstia and the talla,18 with indirect taxes on a larger 
or smaller number of goods or services.19 Thus, the cities’ 
participation in financing the monarchy shifted from the 
compulsory quèstia to the granting of Court subsidies, 
which were theoretically voluntary but in reality more 
onerous. In each case, the first indirect taxes had to be 
subsidised by the king: therefore, this was not exactly city 
taxation but more the towns collecting the royal tax. 
However, taxes to pay the subsidies to the monarchy be-
came the cornerstone of municipal finances.20
On the other hand, the second quarter of the 14th cen-
tury witnessed a virtually incessant round of wars (Sar-
dinian uprisings, war with Genoa, attempted expedition 
against Granada). Furthermore, the subjects also had to 
deal with other traditional royal petitions (coronation, 
marriage, etc.) which weighed heavily on the cities and 
even more so on the Jewish quarters.21 This was when the 
cities began to get into debt, first short-term debt with 
private lenders, either Jewish or Christian, and later long-
term debt through the sale of censals. Likewise, the most 
important market villages also received permission to 
charge taxes.22 The censal quickly became the main in-
strument for financing the urban treasuries23 and the be-
ginning of consolidated debt, which cities used far earlier 
than states.24 In Barcelona, there was a shift from loans 
from private individuals (expensive and short-term) to a 
possible banker who financed the town, along with to the 
sale of censals and violaris (a censal for one or two lives) 25 
which are documented for the first time in 1326 and 
spread quite quickly. As Roustit says, in 1330 the public 
censal was new; by 1350 it had become an essential part of 
municipal financing, even though until 1390 a town had 
to secure royal permission for each new sale.26 Similar de-
velopments can be seen in Girona and Cervera.27 The 
three cornerstones of municipal finances were thus in 
place: talles, taxes and consolidated debt.28
The crisis in the second half  
of the 14th century
The Black Death triggered the first stage of crisis in the 
Middle Ages. The brutal drop in the number of men upset 
all the structures, both economic and social, and left win-
ners and losers in its wake: after the initial upheaval, work-
ers were able to live better in the city and especially in the 
countryside, and commercial relations progressed in the 
volume, range and number of products exchanged. How-
ever, lords and agricultural rentiers saw their incomes 
drop, and the tax burden and especially communal in-
debtedness became more onerous because their weight fell 
upon a severely diminished population. The supposed 
golden age of the peasantry was a passing mirage for many.
This crisis as a moment of change was superimposed 
by an economic depression in the last quarter of the cen-
tury caused by the combination of four problems: two of 
them were found throughout the entire Mediterranean – 
the famines caused by the poor harvests of 1375-1376 and 
the end of the era of plentiful silver – and two of them 
were local – the onset of the conflict of the serfs and the 
paroxysm of private and public indebtedness. The social 
malaise would find a misguided but painful outlet in the 
destruction of the Jewish quarters in 1391.29
The era of the florin and the problems with the relative 
value of the coins 
As mentioned above, in 1346, and therefore on the eve of 
the Black Death, Pere the Ceremonious began to issue 
florins. It was a late decision: the imitated currency had 
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existed for almost a century. What became known as the 
golden florin of Aragon (issued by the king of the Crown 
of Aragon) signalled a threefold break with the previous 
coinage: it was a gold coin, it was the king’s currency and 
it was a currency common to all the lands in the monar-
chy, unlike the silver coins issued by each of the kingdoms 
separately. The florin completed the Catalan monetary 
system, which only underwent minor changes until the 
monetary reform of Ferdinand the Catholic in 1493, 
which would give rise to the system of the Modern Age.
The initial florin of Pere II contained only 2% less gold 
than the Florentine original, but it was quickly weakened 
after successive devaluations until it stabilised in 1363 at 
75% of its initial content, a value it maintained for the rest 
of the Middle Ages.30 Counter to the opinion propounded 
by historians until recently, the florin’s loss in value was 
due not to economic reasons but to the desire to align 
with the concurrent florins in the Piedmont, Provence 
and Flanders.31 Stability was achieved by the intervention 
of the 1365 Courts, which took advantage of a new re-
quest for money from the king to force him to agree to 
stabilise the florin. However, in exchange, the king re-
ceived a concession that would jeopardise monetary sta-
bility in the future: the florin was fixed at eleven sous,32 
which meant a gold and silver ratio of 13:1, very high 
compared to its European contemporaries, which fluctu-
ated between 11 and 11.5.
Croats were undervalued not only in terms of gold but 
also in relation to French blanques, which were valued at 
eight diners (and seven and a half in 1405), while relative 
to the silver content of the croat, the blanca must have 
been valued at six and a half diners.33 In consequence, 
good croats disappeared from circulation as they were 
hoarded or exported, a problem that would last until 
1407. Florins were also at a disadvantage compared to the 
French écu (escut), such that they were accepted under-
weight.
These were recurring problems during the rest of the 
Middle Ages, as was the mismatch between silver content 
and the respective values of the croat and the diner. The 
monetary problems were magnified by the lack of insight 
and extreme conservatism of Barcelona’s authorities, who 
were opposed to any changes.
By law, the croat was supposed to contain the same 
amount of silver as the twelve diners it was worth. The city 
of Barcelona ferociously adhered to this equivalency, even 
though it was obvious that minting twelve diners was 
more costly than minting a croat, and therefore, logic 
would have recommended compensating the expense by 
lowering the silver content of the diner, as other countries 
did.34 This imbalance was aggravated as silver became 
scarcer, especially as a result of the depletion of the Sar-
dinian mines;35 in fact, diners de tern stopped being mint-
ed after 1381. The devaluation that the Barcelona govern-
ment refused to accept came to fruition: diners, which had 
not been replaced and were thus increasingly worn out, 
gave the croat the right additional value, but the scarcity 
of small coin and the disappearance of croats led to com-
plaints and encouraged the circulation of overvalued 
French blanques,36 as well as the proliferation of local 
coins, especially in Terres de Ponent.37 The official imbal-
ance was rectified by the market, which accepted croats at 
14 diners; it ended up being set at 18 diners by Martin the 
Human in 1408.
The monarchs tried to solve these impasses by issuing 
their own silver coins, which clashed with Barcelona’s 
privileges.38 Regarding gold, the value of the French écu 
fell to 15 sous and 7 ½ diners (1398),39 and in 1401 a “taula 
de canvi [exchange bank] to weigh florins” was estab-
lished with the goal of removing those which were under-
weight. By doing so, a comparatively low ratio of 8.75 was 
achieved; exports of silver ceased but exports of florins 
began. Finally, in 1413 blanques and escuts were banned 
from circulation.40
The new taxation
Despite the previous problems, the 1350s signalled a qual-
itative leap in the tightness of the Crown’s finances and 
the creation of state taxation. The war against Genoa and 
the Sardinian uprising, and especially their later overlap 
with the war against Castile after 1356, necessitated more 
resources more quickly. The 1350 Courts of Perpignan 
decreed a general tax on grains, wine, meat and textiles 
for a three-year period, but before that period was over 
the Courts of Vilafranca added a new subsidy for the Roy-
al Branch. This meant a rise in the previous tax rates, but 
even more importantly, it gave the king an advance on his 
tax revenues. Both the taxes and the monetary advances 
to the king were repeated in the subsequent years. The ad-
vances mainly came from certain bankers, but soon they 
also came from the sale of censals by the cities and the 
Diputació del General or Generalitat, the Court’s perma-
nent body that administered the taxes granted to the 
monarchy, which would become the cornerstone of the 
system.41 
The censal became the main instrument of public cred-
it in the second half of the 14th century. As Roustit says, 
the public censal was new in 1330, but by 1350 it was es-
sential to municipal finances. Ortí does not hesitate to de-
scribe its expansion as a second financial revolution. Its 
peak was the second half of the 14th century; afterwards, 
the bankruptcy of many municipal treasuries turned it 
into a less desirable investment.42
The rise in fiscal effort required of the Catalan popula-
tion was achieved in exchange for significant compensa-
tion. First, the creation of the Diputació del General re-
vealed that this was not royal taxation but state taxation.43 
Likewise, in exchange for their money, cities demanded 
privileges and exemptions that would lead to municipal 
autonomy:44 each city could display its book of privileges, 
which were zealously defended. In short, the tightness of 
royal finances required the king to accept pactism; to put 
it more bluntly, the ruling classes exchanged money for 
power.
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The Diputació del General appeared for the first time 
in the 1359 Courts of Cervera as a temporary body to col-
lect and administer revenues, and to borrow money if the 
monarch’s shortfalls made it necessary. The Diputació del 
General quickly shifted from a temporary to a permanent 
body and added the function of serving as a permanent 
organ of the Courts when they were not in session for two 
primary reasons: the overlap of successive deputations as-
signed to manage the donations of different courts, and 
especially the creation of its own taxes (the generalitats, in 
the 1362-1363 Courts of Montsó).
The generalitats were indirect taxes that affected the 
entire land. First, they taxed the production and sale of 
textile goods (called the dret de bolla),45 while secondly 
they taxed foreign trade, both imports and exports (called 
the dret d’entrades i eixides); eighty customs points were 
created to collect the latter. In addition to the generalitats, 
these Courts also granted the king a donation which was 
to be collected via a direct tax according to the number of 
inhabitants of each locale, based on the tally of house-
holds (fogatjament) ordered by the 1359 Courts of Cerve-
ra.46 The 1364-1365 Courts of Tortosa added the third 
definitive pillar to state taxation: permission to obtain the 
money needed quickly through the sale of censals (a per-
petual but redeemable debt) and violaris (life annuities 
for two lifetimes). At that time, the conviction regarding 
the permanence of the institution was so clear that the 
Generalitat opened its first registry.47
Despite the importance of the taxes exacted from all 
subjects, the financial constrictions of the monarchy 
weighed on the Royal Branch: the cities created the public 
tax before the state created its tax, in response to the fiscal 
pressure from the monarchy.48 Indeed, the 1350s were 
crucial in consolidating taxes and granting the right to in-
debtedness through loans or censals. The Crown’s con-
stant requests to the towns ended up transforming the 
censal from indefinite debt to perpetual debt, thus creat-
ing the chronic indebtedness which became quite danger-
ous throughout the second half of the 14th century.49 For 
example, in Barcelona in 1361, the pensions from the cen-
sals accounted for 42% of municipal expenditures, and 
from that year until 1396, the public debt multiplied by 
almost 2.3 times. In other places, such as Cervera and 
Valls, the consequences were even direr.50 The political 
solution of censal debt led to a clearly regressive tax model 
both because of the decrease in talles in favour of taxes 
and because pensions represented a transfer of money 
from the population as a whole to the coffers of the censal 
holders, that is, the wealthier classes.51
Many towns were already experiencing serious finan-
cial difficulties in the late 1350s and did not pay the pen-
sions as punctually as they should have, so they were often 
the subject of grievances and fines that accomplished 
nothing other than increasing the expenditures and non-
payments. Even worse, in the early 1360s it was clear that 
many towns would never be able to pay, and negotiations 
and agreements to lower the pensions got underway.52
However, we should note that despite the huge supply 
of censals for sale, the demand must have been even high-
er if we consider that the interest rate dropped. This de-
crease explains why the censal attracted to the financial 
markets people and institutions that had been removed 
from them in the past – the clearest example is Church 
institutions. However, it is also related to trust in the is-
suer: the city of Barcelona obtained the lowest rates; the 
interest rate of 7.95% in 1371 dropped to 5.78 in 1398-
1399 and 4% in 1405. In contrast, in this latter year, Mal-
lorca had to pay 10% to find buyers, while other towns 
like Tortosa and Lleida paid intermediate rates.53
The peak of the mediaeval bank
Even though we do not have sufficient information on the 
evolution in banking techniques, it seems clear that they 
were fully developed by the second half of the 14th century.54 
At that time, Barcelona became a prime banking centre, al-
though local banking merchants did not play a central role in 
the industry. The tendency in Catalan banking seems to have 
leaned more towards public finances in their different guises, 
or perhaps those bankers were the ones that left the clearest 
document trail, often because of their bankruptcies.55
In addition to institutional credit and partial invest-
ments of the money deposited in mercantile credit, basi-
cally in the guise of orders, the Barcelona moneychangers, 
and especially their Italian counterparts headquartered in 
Barcelona,56 were also quite active in the business of bills 
of exchange, which seem to have become common in Bar-
celona by the last quarter of the 14th century.57
Figure 2. Gothic gallery of the Palau de la Generalitat, built in the 
early 14th century. The Palau de la Generalitat is a good show of the 
institution’s power.
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In the second half of the 14th century, Barcelona’s banks 
seem to have undergone two main waves of bankruptcies: 
the first in the 1350s and the second between 1375 and 
1383. In 1359, Jaume des Vilar, the leading banker in the 
city of Barcelona, was brought down, and others were the 
next year, including Francesc Castelló, the only banker 
who was subjected to the barbarous provision that ordered 
the beheading of bankrupt moneychangers.58 Therefore, 
we should ask whether the other bankrupt bankers had 
managed to reach agreements with their creditors or 
whether there were extenuating circumstances in the case 
of Francesc Castelló. We are not aware of the reasons for 
these bankruptcies in 1359-1360, but they might have 
been related to the war with Castile. However, this was just 
a single coincidence; in the ensuing years, we are aware of 
flourishing bankers with notable activity in both Barcelo-
na and the towns of Tarragona, Girona and Tortosa.59
The crisis in the last quarter of the century
Just as in all crises, a temporary crisis caused by the re-
peated poor harvests in the Mediterranean in 1374 and 
137660 led to a profound structural financial crisis due to 
the intersection of three interrelated phenomena: the end 
of plentiful silver;61 the economy’s maximum exposure to 
debt, especially public debt; and the insolvency of the 
monarchy, which was in the grips of the war with Castile 
and the Sardinian uprisings.
The crisis was felt deeply in the Catalan banking indus-
try, especially in the banks more closely involved in fi-
nancing the monarchy. In 1381, Pere des Caus and An-
dreu d’Olivella, the main lenders to the monarchy since at 
least 1374, went bankrupt.62 Their bank did offer the king 
advances with their own money, although they usually act-
ed via third parties by guaranteeing the loans that private 
individuals made to the monarch. Since the money was 
deposited in the bank, des Caus and d’Olivella were re-
sponsible for the amount.63 As a guarantee of their inter-
mediation, the bankers had been assigned several revenue 
sources from the monarchy, such as the collection of 
household taxes and the donations to the king from the 
Kingdom of Mallorca. However, in the autumn of 1380 
the agricultural crisis and previous indebtedness brought 
this island’s economy to the brink of bankruptcy: virtually 
no money left the island, either for the king or for the pri-
vate censal holders. Pere des Caus and Andreu d’Olivella 
were doubly compromised: many of the lenders did not 
renew their expired credits, and the income assigned to 
them only covered a small portion of the king’s debt to the 
bank. By late 1380, the king and his primogenitor owed 
des Caus and d’Olivella more than 314,000 pounds.64 Hav-
ing reached that point, the king resorted to subterfuge 
and stopped paying,65 and the bankers were only able to 
hold out until March 1381, although legally the bankrupt-
cy never actually happened because the king granted the 
bankers a moratorium. Pere des Caus and Andreu 
d’Olivella may have been the most prominent ones, but 
they were not the only bankers harmed by the monarchy’s 
insolvency: less than two years later, Pere Pasqual and Ar-
nau Esquerit fell in Barcelona, Ramon Medir in Girona 
and Bartomeu Garí in Perpignan,66 and in the ensuing 
years they were joined by the banks of Provençal and Bru-
net, the bank of Colom, that of Raboster and others.67
The entire economic world of Catalonia appeared to 
have been affected by the twofold economic and financial 
crisis: the major consequences of the crisis include the at-
tack on the Jewish quarters (1391) and the revaluation of 
capital, which Vilar and Vicens claim heralded the shift 
from an entrepreneurial society to a rentier society.68 This 
thesis, which is even accepted today among the majority 
of historians, requires further nuancing: first, the bank-
ruptcies did not involve huge losses of capital given that 
most of the debt was usurious interest; likewise, through 
an examination of the list of creditors of the bank of des 
Caus and d’Olivella and the subsequent books of the 
Taula de Canvi, we can see somewhat scant participation 
by commercial capital in credit at fixed interest rates.69 In 
fact, the crisis was limited to the monarchy’s credit banks: 
Riu cites eight banks that remained standing in Barcelona 
during the ensuing years.70
There was yet another consequence of the collapse of 
the financial system: the creation of the Taula de Canvi de 
Barcelona. However, I prefer to regard it not as the culmi-
nation of the crisis but instead as the start of its recovery.
Recovery and clashes in the 15th century
The crisis in the last quarter of the 14th century was ex-
tremely dire in the fiscal, financial and monetary worlds, 
and in its social aspects as well, but the economy only suf-
fered from a few short-term jolts: the pace of growth 
dropped in around 1415, and even more steeply in around 
1435, but there was overall growth until the beginning of the 
Catalan Civil War from 1462 to 1472, albeit at a slower rate 
and lower than in the competing countries.71 The first half 
of the 15th century was also the time of Catalonia’s peak po-
litical and military power, with milestones such as the pil-
lage of Marseille in 1423 and the conquest of Naples in 1445.
Despite this, it was an era of upheaval, mainly because 
of the coexistence of three interrelated clashes, all of 
which had clear political undercurrents: between lords 
and serfs owing to the latters’ aspirations for freedom and 
land; between the urban patrician class and the working 
classes, as the latter wanted to participate in municipal 
government; and between the local institutions (the 
Courts, the Generalitat and the monarchy) over control 
of power and taxes. These varied clashes would lead the 
country to the Civil War of 1462-1472.
The Taula de Canvis i Comuns Dipòsits of the city  
of Barcelona
The financial crisis of the 1380s prompted a great deal of 
mistrust towards banks. However, there was some capital 
(judicial, from corporations, trusteeships, etc.) that nec-
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essarily had to be deposited in the taula de canvi, the mu-
nicipal bank, which was therefore exposed to its dangers. 
Furthermore, bankers sparked bitter complaints because 
they hoarded good coin and paid with poor coin.72 Like-
wise, the city of Barcelona watched as the money from 
taxes deposited in private banks was endangered, while it 
simultaneously yearned for better control over its financ-
es and was bound by the amount of the pensions of the 
censals and volaris it had sold.
In an attempt to resolve all these problems, in 1401 the 
Consell de Cent created the first public bank in Europe: 
the Taula de Canvis i Comuns Dipòsits de la Ciutat de 
Barcelona.73 Its main purposes were to pay with good 
coin (taula de canvi or exchange bank),74 and to concen-
trate forced deposits75 and incomes and payments of the 
city, as well as voluntary deposits (comuns dipòsits). The 
Taula offered security, since it was guaranteed by all the 
municipal taxes, and it offered savings: the entries in its 
accounts, just like in any other insured bank, had the val-
ue of a notarised receipt of payment.76 However, the City, 
which defrayed the institution’s salaries and other ex-
penses, was the only legal beneficiary of the Taula’s cred-
it,77 and this more than offset its expenses: it earned mon-
ey from the Taula both to make payments and to redeem 
censals and violaris. In fact, in the early years the city of 
Barcelona seemed to be abusing this credit so much that it 
sparked doubts regarding the institution’s trustworthi-
ness,78 which was probably aggravated by the bankruptcy 
of the two leading private bankers who had accounts in 
the Taula and had been allowed overdraughts: the Gual-
bes and Massana banks.79
The role played by the Taula de Canvi in the economy 
of both Barcelona and Catalonia as a whole has been de-
bated: counter to the traditional praise, Vicens Vives re-
gards it as a myopic, defensive solution which kept capital 
away from mercantile business. Vilar shades this opinion 
by assessing the Taula de Canvi’s role in putting a damper 
on municipal debt and countering the insecurity of pri-
vate banking. My opinion (which is shared by Adroer and 
Riera Melis) is that it was a beneficial institution for both 
the city and private individuals, and that the capital im-
mobilised in the Taula was unlikely to have been invested 
in business.80
The first known ordinances, which date from 1412, 
regulated the Taula’s relationship with the municipal cla-
varia (treasury) by assigning the collections of certain 
taxes to specific expenditures, which rather turned the re-
gents of the Taula into inspectors of municipal spend-
ing.81 The stricter oversight and the fact that the Generali-
tat and other institutions deposited their funds in the 
Taula restored the public’s trust in this institution to such 
an extent that in the future most of the leases of seigniori-
al rights indicate that the payments were to be made to the 
Taula de Canvi de Barcelona.
The success of the Taula was immediate and impor-
tant: a kind of income statement from 1433 shows that the 
amount of capital deposited was thirteen times the mu-
nicipal income. The cash coefficient was approximately 
one-third of deposits; the rest of the money was used to 
redeem the city’s censals, thus lowering its debt.82 These 
proportions remained in place with minor fluctuations 
until the Civil War, while the capital deposited in the 
Taula grew considerably: from 175,000 pounds in 1433, 
the deposits rose to 375,000 in 1451, and on the eve of the 
Civil War they surpassed 600,000 pounds. All told, there 
were twice as many voluntary as forced deposits,83 and 
even more importantly, the Taula’s credit allowed censals 
to be redeemed, lowering the amount of the pensions the 
city paid by around one-third.84
The Taula de Canvi’s transactions were conditioned by 
two intertwined problems: clashes with private banking 
and the struggle to set the value of coins. They both pre-
dated that time: all we have to do is recall the bank ordi-
nances from 1397 and the attempts at monetary reform, 
especially during the reign of Martin the Humane. De-
spite this and the two suspensions of payment at times of 
war, in 1468 and towards the end of the Catalan Revolt 
(1640-1652), public trust in the Taula remained steady 
until the abolition of the Consell de Cent (the traditional 
corporate municipal organization) and of the Catalan 
state after the victory of the Bourbons in 1714.
An active bank, but one under suspicion
The relationship between the Taula de Canvi and private 
banks was always tense: the Consell de Cent favoured the 
Taula and wanted to control the activities of private 
banks, which were reasonably and sensibly considered 
harmful to the desired monetary stability and the city’s 
interests. At first, the creation of the Taula had deprived 
private bankers of the forcible deposits which they had re-
ceived before, and in 1441 they were also obligated to 
keep their term deposits and those of the monasteries and 
pious organisations in the Taula.85 However, more im-
portantly, the city of Barcelona had a belligerent attitude 
towards private bankers, although it was neither constant 
nor terribly effective: in 1433 they were banned from 
holding accounts in the Taula, and in 1437 the Consell de 
Cent issued a reminder that moneychangers had to be in-
sured. It also required them to update their bonds every 
four years and banned them from creating new banks 
without city permission, which was granted on a highly 
restrictive basis. Even Jaume de Casasaja, a financier who 
had earned the king’s trust, was at first refused a license 
with the excuse that there were already enough private 
bankers.86 The outcome was the proliferation of money-
changers who accepted money on deposit and intervened 
in bills of exchange against ordinances and without insur-
ance.87 The most well-grounded accusations that could be 
levelled at the bankers were that they paid late and in poor 
coin, they committed a great deal of fraud, and they often 
went bankrupt.88
The Consell de Cent also used the Taula against private 
bankers when issuing bills of exchange, based on the er-
roneous belief that speculation with exchanges led to the 
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flight of good coin. In 1446, the city of Barcelona banned 
private bankers from negotiating bills of exchange, in a 
failed attempt to concentrate their payment in the Taula.89 
The complaints were largely targeted against Italian bank-
ers and businessmen, who were very active in negotiating 
bills of exchange – which were used in a wide variety of 
ways90 especially in the Italy-Flanders-Catalonia (Barce-
lona or Perpignan) triangle, which was used quite heavily 
by the Datini and other large Italian companies – and bills 
of exchange between Naples and Barcelona during the 
campaigns of Alfons the Magnanimous.91 The problem 
was resolved in 1449 when the city lifted the ban on the 
condition that the bankers apply the official currency ex-
change rate.92
The tax burden and the monetary needs  
of the monarchy
The heavy direct fiscal pressure in the second half of the 
14th century was relieved during the subsequent period, 
particularly because of the decrease in military spending 
but also because of the oversight of the Generalitat and 
the Courts’ resistance to the monarchy’s demands. The 
monarchs always had difficulties getting the money they 
needed for their enterprises, first because they could 
hardly subject their vassals to greater fiscal pressure, and 
secondly because the traditional oligarchy made the new 
Trastàmara dynasty, originally from Castile, pay for its 
dubious legitimacy and shallow roots. Ferdinand I was 
obligated to accept the limitations of royal authority, 
which we know as pactism, in the Courts of 1413 and 
1421-1422.93 The king ruled in practice, but the Courts 
and the Generalitat controlled him politically and finan-
cially.94
Resistance to the monarchs’ monetary demands had 
clear political motivations, but it also reflected the weight 
of the debt generated in the previous era in both the Gen-
eralitat and the municipalities. Until 1428, the revenues of 
the Generalitat fluctuated between 50,000 and 60,000 
pounds; the 1430s were characterised by a decline in rev-
enues which, coupled with a careless and not always hon-
est administration, led to the Generalitat’s increasing in-
debtedness. However, in the ensuing years it was able to 
pay off the censals and secure lower interest rates.95
In parallel, many municipalities were being strangled 
by the pensions they had to pay, even though a financial 
structure to serve the debt had been established. In Cer-
vera, Montblanc, Lleida, Berga, Manresa, Tarragona and 
Valls, the debt had become untenable by the late 14th 
century and the towns resorted to a new kind of income, 
the perpetual or non-redeemable censal which was, there-
fore, no longer a censal. Thus, the towns could get money 
to redeem the more expensive censals and momentarily 
clean up their local finances at the expense of deferring 
their debt.96 It was not enough: Valls in 1406, Montblanc 
in 1410, Cervera and Lleida in 1413 and Balaguer, Tarra-
gona, Manresa, Berga and Cardona in undetermined 
years, but around the same time, had to bite the bullet and 
suspend the payment of all censals with an interest rate 
 
Figure 3. Bill of exchange of Alphonse 
the Magnanimous from 1444, issued in 
Naples to be paid in Barcelona.
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higher than 3.3% (2.5% in Montblanc). The censal hold-
ers had no choice but to accept the downgrade.97 Yet the 
relief was only temporary: in 1430-1431, Cervera was 
once again selling censals at 8.3%, and at the onset of the 
Civil War, the municipal finances were once again on the 
verge of collapse. The course of events and the result must 
not have been too different in many other places.98
However, the monarchs continued to need more mon-
ey than what they could eke from their subjects. The in-
sufficiency of the monarchy’s finances soared as a result 
of Alfons the Magnanimous’ Mediterranean expansion-
ism, culminating with the conquest of Naples. The king 
financed this enterprise through donations from Courts, 
which were costly to obtain, although the monarch always 
considered them insufficient. However, their implica-
tions for his subjects were a rise in fiscal pressure and the 
issuance of public debt.99 He also tried to retrieve alienat-
ed jurisdictions, which he only managed to partially 
achieve at the expense of the towns, which either willingly 
or forcibly had to pay the price of rejoining the royal ju-
risdiction.100 In 1446, he ordered an inventory of all the 
royal assets, from castles to estates, with the goal of recov-
ering those which were held without proper transfer 
deeds, a difficult feat to accomplish for the older cessions 
and usurpations. The Courts were opposed to this meas-
ure and were dissolved in 1448. The king managed to em-
bargo a few lands at the cost of further distancing himself 
from the privileged estates.
Faced with the opposition of the Courts and financial 
strangulation, the king undertook two policies which 
would lay the groundwork of the Civil War. First, he sup-
ported the serfs and the urban middle classes in their 
struggle against the traditional oligarchy with the idea of 
weakening it from both inside and outside the Courts.101 
Even worse, he began to enact laws that benefitted the 
highest bidder, changing decisions time and again de-
pending on the amounts the conflicting parties offered 
him. The situation was particularly scandalous in 1452-
1455: the venality of the king did nothing other than 
heavily poison the conflicts.102
Urban conflicts, with monetary policy as the battlefield
The urban patrician class had a de facto monopoly on 
municipal power everywhere, and it used this power to 
forward its interests. The area where this domination was 
the most important and has been studied the most is in 
Barcelona. Theoretically, the Consell de Cent had sover-
eignty over municipal affairs. The urban patrician class 
(honorary citizens) and guild masters sat on the Consell, 
which was presided over by an executive of five counsel-
lors, positions that were reserved for the oligarchy, espe-
cially after the reform of Joan II in 1388. The counsellors 
managed municipal policy according to their class inter-
ests and only brought minor issues to the Consell de Cent 
for discussion.103 Positions, offices and municipal com-
missions (with the wheat supply as the juiciest business) 
were thus divided among a small group of families which 
were believed to be the Biga (beam) that upheld the city. 
The Biga imposed a heavily orthodox, conservative mon-
etary policy which was favourable to its own interests as 
rentiers, along with a liberal trade policy that also benefit-
ted them as the importers of spices and luxury fabrics.
Although the urban economy operated without too 
many hindrances, the situation did lead to complaints 
about poor governance; it also led to isolated incidents 
which became increasingly serious with the manufactur-
ing and trade crisis that came into clear focus in 1435: an 
uprising in 1436 ended with four executions.104 Almost 
immediately, the Busca (splinter) sprang from the middle 
classes in opposition to the conservative Biga with a four-
point programme: participation in municipal power, the 
correction of abuses, economic protectionism and mone-
tary reform. In fact, the Busca served as an umbrella for 
two groups with divergent interests which banded togeth-
er because of their opposition to the Biga: on the one 
hand, the Sindicat dels Tres Estaments (Union of the 
Three Estates: merchants, artisans and tradesmen), who 
tended towards radicalism; and on the other hand, a 
group of merchants and masters of the leading trades, 
who had attained financial status similar to that of the pa-
trician class and were, in fact, even more dynamic, al-
though they were excluded from political power. The lat-
ter were members of the moderate Busca, which enjoyed 
the monarchy’s favour and always served as the repre-
sentatives of the movement.105
Municipal corruption and especially municipal deficit, 
particularly the steep increase it experienced in 1447-
1452, rendered the situation unsustainable and weakened 
the Biga, but only the king could change the regulations to 
put an end to its monopoly. Despite the doubts and reluc-
tance which allowed him to extract money from both 
sides, the king showed his preference for the Busca: with 
the reform of the municipal administrations he sought to 
both keep domestic peace and get money, directly from 
the city of Barcelona (which would also serve as an exam-
ple for other cities) and indirectly from the Courts, where 
a Barcelona allied with the monarchy allowed to king to 
more easily overcome the rejection or reluctance of the 
estates.
In November 1453, Governor General Requesens, act-
ing on the king’s orders, suspended the statutory election 
of councillors and appointed a council of men from the 
Busca. Then, in 1455, a new regulation on the election of 
councillors “democratised” the city, allowed the trades-
men to join the Consell106 and granted more taxation 
power to the Consell de Cent. Thereupon, the most im-
portant economic reforms were undertaken: the protec-
tionist measures issued in 1422107 were revived and the 
monetary policy was reformed.
The need to reform the currency had been one of the 
Busca’s battering rams against the power of the Biga. The 
intersecting problems were the same as always: the short-
age and poor quality of fractional coins; the difference be-
tween the silver contained in the croat and its equivalent 
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twelve diners;108 the ratio between gold and silver, that is, 
between the florin and the croat; and the invasion of for-
eign money, partly to offset the shortages of circulating 
hard cash and partly because of the traditional excessive 
valuation, which did not take into account the devalua-
tions that these coins underwent.109
The Biga firmly upheld the traditional equivalences be-
cause both possible solutions seriously jeopardised its in-
terests: raising the value of the croat lowered its income 
and declared capital, both of which were fixed in diners;110 
while the alternative, lowering the metal content of the 
coin, harmed import trade. However, this inactivity led 
the croats and florins to disappear from circulation, re-
placed by foreign coins with a lower real value. As always, 
poor coin replaced good coin.111
The Busca, which upheld the interests of the producers, 
advocated setting higher values for the croat and florin, 
thereby devaluing the functional currency which would 
allow it to have diners, that is, small coins, and thus align 
Catalan currency with the neighbouring monetary sys-
tems. However, the monetary devaluation also sought to 
make imports more expensive and thus facilitate exports 
and create jobs. On the other hand, the devaluation of the 
diner favoured debtors, including the municipality and 
the king. Ultimately, the issue was who was going to foot 
the bill for the crisis.
The Busca’s proposal was to value the croat at 18 diners 
and the florin at 13 sous, while the Biga only agreed to 
raise the croat to 15 diners. After the king vacillated with-
out taking a final decision for more than a year, in 1456 he 
decreed that a croat was worth 18 diners (thus the diner 
lost one-third of its value) and that the florin was worth 
13 sous (thus silver lost 18.18% compared to gold). How-
ever, the deposits in the Taula de Canvi de Barcelona and 
the value of some censals and public contracts would be 
increased by two sous and eight diners per pound, or 
13.33%, which accounted for 40% of the loss. Thus, wide-
ly accepted monetary stability was achieved, which, how-
ever, the war would once again topple. Nonetheless, the 
reform did not get more small coin circulating, most like-
ly because hammering coins was still a poor business, 
even with the croat worth 18 diners.
The Busca’s reforms were not as effective as expected, 
and the members soon fell into the same vices for which 
they had criticised the men of the Biga.112 All of this led to 
a decline in prestige and divisiveness within the Busca, 
while factional shifts allowed the Biga to win back munic-
ipal power in 1460. From there, it would play a highly ac-
tive role in the outbreak and financing of the Civil War.
Civil War (1462-1472) and political and 
economic decline
Despite the political and social confrontations of the pre-
vious decades, upon the death of Alfons the Magnani-
mous in 1458 nothing intimated at an imminent conflict. 
In fact, the spark that kindled the conflict was largely ran-
dom: if the heir to the Crown, Carles, Prince of Viana, had 
not died in 1461 with suspicions of having been poisoned 
by his stepmother, Joana Enríquez, the Generalitat would 
not have been able to prompt enough of an anti-monar-
chic climate to rise up in arms against the king.
The war ruins the public and private finances
I shall discuss not how the war unfolded but instead only 
its effects on currency, banking and finances.113 The first 
thing to mention is that the confrontation lasted ten years 
because of each side’s inability to amass enough means to 
prevail over the other. Peace came because by 1472 nei-
ther side had enough money to continue the conflict.
The financing of the war by the Catalan institutions 
largely befell the city of Barcelona, which in the summer 
of 1462 voted on an extraordinary tax of 60,000 pounds, 
which it hoped to offset with surcharges on the taxes on 
meat, wine and fresh fish.114 This money was mostly spent 
in 1462 and 1463; afterwards, regular spending dropped 
considerably and was once again financed by raising the 
taxes on foodstuffs, selling censals and securing more ad-
vances from the Taula de Canvi.
The Generalitats, both the one in Barcelona and its 
royalist counterpart in Tarragona,115 imposed new taxes 
and charges and issued a huge number of censals, but they 
never managed to raise enough financing, as the com-
plaints from the military chiefs clearly reveal.116
The Taula de Canvi underwent a twofold process that 
lowered its cash flow: many deposits were withdrawn as 
the city of Barcelona withdrew increasing amounts of 
money to finance the war. In January 1463, the Taula’s 
reserves were already low, and in the ensuing years it 
took a number of steps that were essentially a disguised 
suspension of payments, such as selling censals at in-
creasingly high rates, offering interest for money depos-
ited as high as 15% and lowering cash payments to small 
amounts. Finally, the Taula went bankrupt in February 
1468: the war had depleted Barcelona’s entire savings.117 
However, this bankruptcy did not mean the liquidation 
of the Taula: before a month had gone by, it opened once 
again with a “new account”, deposits which were usually 
negotiable and reimbursable. The previous deposits or 
“old accounts” could only make payments via transfers 
between accounts; their holders were offered the chance 
of recovering the money deposited in censals at 5%. 
Whoever did not want to accept this offer had to wait un-
til the Taula had enough resources to pay.118 The war led 
not only the Taula de Canvi de Barcelona to bankruptcy 
but also many local treasuries which were unable to pay 
the pensions from the censals. In Cervera, for example, 
the censal holders were paid nothing between 1462 and 
1481,119 and the same surely occurred in other places as 
well.
Private banks also suffered greatly from the effects of 
the confrontation: in addition to the usual problems dur-
ing times of conflict, the traditional distrust of the city of 
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Barcelona and the need to hoard money for the war at the 
start of the conflict led it to demand compliance with the 
1437 ordinance,120 which prompted the closure of several 
banks. In 1467, the activity of private banks was suspend-
ed given the obligation that all payments be made via the 
Taula, which, as mentioned above, entered the operations 
into the books but did not pay in cash.121
The monetary system was also affected: the war led to 
changes in the valuation of currencies and the appear-
ance of new currencies. Given the shortage of coins, they 
were paid with a bonus: in 1467 the florin was worth 15 
sous, and in 1472 it was worth 17 ½, while the croat rose 
to 20 diners. Issuing coins was only possible by lowering 
their quality, but the Consell de Cent would not budge 
even under these circumstances; it rejected the attempt 
by the newly elected king, Pere of Portugal, to mint low-
grade croats. However, gold coin fell within the king’s 
purview, and this allowed him to mint a new coin, the 
pacific, which copied the Portuguese crusado. If we com-
pare its gold content with the florin, it should have been 
worth 14 ½ sous; however, since the king was asking for it 
to be valued at 18, the Consell de Cent attributed no 
equivalency to the pacific, although the market immedi-
ately accepted it at 20, the value of the Venetian ducat.122 
On the other hand, the shortage of small coins led cities 
and villages on both sides to mint local coins, regardless 
of whether or not they had permission to do so. Despite 
their lower value, these pieces, which were usually made 
of copper, were accepted as worth one diner, and this 
minting continued after the war ended, despite the pro-
tests from Barcelona.123
Post-war difficulties and insufficient redress
The capitulation of Pedralbes (1472), which put an end to 
the war, sought to deny that there had been an uprising, 
in that everything had to return to its previous state of af-
fairs. However, there had been a war, and there were win-
ners and losers: acting like nothing had happened was 
pure chimera. Setting aside largely irrelevant political fac-
tors,124 the war had destroyed Catalan trade and with it 
the economy of the Principality. The best summary of the 
situation is still in Vilar’s words in the titles of “La crisi 
sobreviu a la guerra” (The crisis survives the war) and “La 
crisi sobreviu als primers esforços de redreçament (1484-
1487)” (The crisis survives the early efforts at redress 
(1484-1487)).125 Emerging from the crisis took at least 15 
years; yet Catalonia never fully regained the power it had 
had before. It was scarcely able to take advantage of the 
shift towards an expansive economy that Europe was ex-
periencing after 1488.126
At the same time, there were pressing financial prob-
lems which were necessarily linked to political decisions: 
the main ones were the return of seized assets; the late 
payment of debt and revenues, especially the pensions 
from the censals; and the recovery of the public finances, 
from the royal to the municipal and the Generalitat.127
As a whole, these issues were not resolved until the very 
important Courts of 1480-1481 during the reign of Ferdi-
nand II. The Courts granted the king a subsidy of 100,000 
pounds to compensate his supporters. Even though it was 
a minuscule sum if we bear in mind the sheer amount of 
goods to be restored, the agreement allowed property to 
be returned to its previous owners. The same Courts rec-
ognised the debt issued by the Catalan institutions to fi-
nance the conflict; to pay the censals, which the Generali-
tat and many town halls could not handle, discounts 
ranging from 20% to 40% were established in the pen-
sions to be paid depending on whether the beneficiaries 
had supported the monarchy’s cause or not.128
Seigniorial and agrarian revenues were much harder to 
collect, although this varied widely depending on the 
place. In fact, the post-war period partly held the territory 
impenetrable for the officials and seigniorial or royal col-
lectors,129 but the same Courts of 1480-1481 abolished the 
interlocutory judgement of 1455 and returned to the lords 
all their traditional rights to serfs. The upshot was the Sec-
ond Revolt of the Remences (1484-1485). The remences 
(redemption payments paid by serfs) were abolished and 
the serfs’ leader, Pere Joan Sala, was executed, but it was 
soon clear that the serfs were in a better position to con-
tinue the struggle than the monarchy and the lords. This 
allowed both parties to accept the king’s arbitration, lead-
ing to the Arbitration Judgement of Guadalupe (1486), 
which pacified the Catalan countryside.
The restoration of the Taula and private banking
Despite its bankruptcy in 1467, the Taula de Canvi man-
aged to regain the public’s trust quickly, first because pri-
vate banking was not entirely reliable, and secondly 
thanks to the privilege which safeguarded the deposits 
from any confiscation or seizure, a privilege which had 
been granted in 1468 by Joan de Lorena130 and was once 
again granted by Joan II in 1472.131 In any event, the defi-
cit in municipal finances continued to thwart the stability 
of the Taula: the pensions to be paid from the censals to-
talled 40,000 pounds, but the city revenues were far be-
neath this amount, such that delays in the payments be-
came greater and greater and the municipal debt once 
again imperilled the Taula. Finally, in 1491 the interests 
on the pensions were lowered by 15% for twelve years, 
which allowed the city to almost break even by 1500.132
After the war, there were eight private bankers in Bar-
celona, and the ban on their keeping accounts open in the 
Taula was renewed in 1476.133 In compensation, they 
were authorised to negotiate bills of exchange, the other 
divisive issue between the Taula and private bankers, as 
long as they respected the obligation to apply the same in-
terest rate on the currencies as the Taula de Canvi. In-
deed, this was the content of the 1449 agreement.134
The redress of the market 
The Courts of 1480-1481 also instituted what was called 
the redreç de la mercaderia (redress of the market). The 
goal was to revive the Busca’s policy of tariffs aimed at 
Catalan historical review_9.indb   35 08/06/2016   12:37:10
36   Cat. Hist. Rev. 9, 2016 Gaspar Feliu
protecting trade and the most important sectors of Cata-
lan manufacturing (cloth, wrought iron, coral and leather 
products), with the addition of the king’s concession of a 
market reserved for the island of Sardinia, where only 
Catalans could bring textiles and purchase unworked cor-
al. In 1504, the reserve for the cloth market was expanded 
to Sicily and Naples along with the markets in North Af-
rica.135 More than a redress, these measures were defen-
sive and reveal the loss of competitiveness in internation-
al markets, compounded by the lack of confidence in 
recovering it. However, we should bear in mind that the 
redress had to adapt to new situations: despite the pres-
tige of trade with the East, the intervention in the Atlantic 
world was far more profitable, as was trade with inland 
Castile, especially the markets of Medina. In contrast, the 
tariff benefits in the ports of North Africa were taken ad-
vantage of directly not by the Catalans but by the German 
merchants, who purportedly acted as the clerks of the 
Catalan merchants.136 The redress was further complicat-
ed by the instatement of the Castilian Inquisition in 1487 
and the expulsion of the Jews in 1492.
Despite this, Catalonia’s manufacturing capacity re-
mained virtually intact and witnessed a rise in artisanal 
output and exports of fabric outside of Barcelona, espe-
cially in the area between Barcelona, Manresa, Berga, Rip-
oll and Perpignan. On the other hand, there is a sector in 
which Catalonia, and especially in Barcelona, excelled 
during that period: insurance. This indicates that despite 
the financial collapse and the cost of war, both direct and 
indirect owing to the failure to pay income, small amounts 
of capital could still be amassed for a secure and fairly 
profitable business which diluted risk by participating in 
many operations but risking little money in each of them. 
This success can primarily be explained by an advanta-
geous legal regulation: the ordinances of 1484 were com-
paratively quite liberal and, among many other factors, 
allowed up to seven-eighths of the value of the goods sail-
ing in Catalan ships to be insured, and three-fourths on 
foreign vessels, a difference that was systematically ig-
nored.137 This turned Barcelona into a major insurance 
hub, even for routes that did not stop there, such as jour-
neys between Andalusia and the Canary Islands and back, 
or between Andalusia and the Netherlands, Aigues-
Mortes, Rhodes, Crete or Alexandria, and from Mallorca 
to Ragusa or Venice.138
Ferdinand II’s monetary reorganisation
In the late 15th century, the status of the European mon-
etary system was characterised by stable gold stocks and a 
rise in silver exports.139 However, in Catalonia the diner 
kept losing value: in April 1491, the pacific remained at 20 
sous, but the florin had risen to 17, such that gold was still 
overvalued compared to in the neighbouring countries, 
once again prompting a flight of croats.140
This was the situation when Ferdinand II carried out a 
general overhaul of the currency in 1493, which would 
serve as the foundation of the Catalan monetary system of 
the Modern Age.141 First, the diner was devalued so that 
its silver content was only 60% of the theoretical diner de 
tern. The croat was revalued at 24 diners, twice its original 
value, but it still contained more silver than 24 ordinary 
diners.142 This inconsistency was resolved by decreeing 
that it was not compulsory to accept the diner, that is, by 
reducing its function to amounts lower than one croat. 
Thus, it was no longer a real coin but instead became a fi-
duciary coin, a very modern solution.
Ferdinand II also introduced a new gold coin which 
quickly replaced both the florin and the pacific: the princi-
pat, a copy of the Venetian ducat, the leading internation-
al currency at the time. Both the principat and its Castil-
ian equivalent, the excelente de la Granada, were always 
known as ducats.
Conclusions
The most important change experienced by Catalan cur-
rency during the last two centuries of the Middle Ages 
was the introduction of gold coin, the florin, a sign of 
power, but also a source of headaches because of its rela-
tionship with silver coin. The monetary problems came 
from the strict orthodoxy upheld by Barcelona’s Consell 
de Cent, which was in charge of silver coin in an ever-
changing milieu with coins of lower value, which repeat-
edly led to the flight of good coin and the circulation of 
foreign pieces worth less. Despite this, a positive note is 
the hardiness of Catalan coin, which was spared the dras-
tic fluctuations experienced by Castilian and French coin: 
the diner de tern always retained its original value and 
two-thirds of it until it was halved just on the eve of mo-
dernity.
Banking developed in Catalonia in the 14th century, 
both technically and in the volume of deposits. The de-
posits allowed the banks to grant loans, which flowed to-
wards commercial orders and the currency exchange 
business (especially by the Italian bankers living in Cata-
lonia), as well as towards the direct or indirect financing 
of the monarchy. Often the banks retained an insufficient 
cash flow coefficient, making bankruptcies a frequent oc-
currence; the most famous ones came in the 1380s and 
were caused by the monarchy’s insolvency. Local private 
banks never fully recovered from this setback: in the 15th 
century, public banking emerged via the Taula de Canvi 
de Barcelona, Italian merchant bankers proliferated and 
there was stricter oversight of the private banks both to 
avoid real or assumed abuses and because of the city of 
Barcelona’s interest in ensuring the success of the Taula 
de Canvi, which furnished it money to pay censals, thus 
lowering the debt burden.
State taxation was established in the first half of the 
14th century, and it was controlled by the Courts and 
their offshoot, the Diputació del General. The increase in 
taxes was possible because of the success of the economy, 
even though it also put a damper on the economy.
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Primarily after 1435, the urban economic crisis trans-
lated into a social struggle against the oligarchy (the Biga), 
while the countryside was riven with the conflict between 
the serfs and the lords and the clash between the monar-
chy and the oligarchy, represented in the Courts. This all 
led to the Civil War of 1462-1472 and the country’s eco-
nomic ruin. The subsequent attempts at redress failed to 
restore Catalonia’s earlier power, which, coupled with its 
permanent distancing from the royal court, practically 
erased Catalonia from both the political and economic 
maps.
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